Abstract: Th e article deals with following issues: -plurality of mass media as a freedom of speech principle, -regulation of mass media and its two faces: regulation as a way of limitation of freedom of expression and regulation as a way of protection of freedom of expression, -danger of mass-media monopoly for "free trade of ideas", -regulation of content versus regulation of access, the question of positive obligations of state power resulting from constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, -legal means for securing of mass-media plurality and question of its constitutional conformity with protection of property (regulation of mass-media ownership as a protection of freedom of speech).
Pluralism of mass media as a part of the freedom of expression
A mutual competition and plurality of information and ideas as well as a multiplicity and a mutual competition of the media themselves should be regarded as one of the conditions for the functioning of a democratic state and for the widest possible discussion on matters of public interest. Th ere should be not only the widest plurality of contents but also the widest plurality of multipliers (ie. broadcasters, publishers).
Should be this pluralism of the media considered a constitutional principle? National constitutions generally don't speak about the principle of pluralism of the media explicitly. We could fi nd some references concerning media pluralism within the frame of the European countries in the constitutions of Portugal, Spain and Greece (see below). Th e principle of plurality of the media is mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also. Th is relatively new type of human rights document guarantees freedom of expression in Art. 11 which states in paragraph 2: "Th e freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected" 2 . Th e plurality of media is understood here as a human rights principle.
Th e protection of media pluralism should be regarded as an integral part of the guarantee of the freedom of expression even without explicit mention in the constitution.
However, media pluralism could not be considered a subjective constitutional right of individuals in a vertical relationship between the state and individual (in the form of a "right to pluralism"), but should be considered an objective constitutional value, which is derived from the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of expression. Every democratic state is bound by such constitutional value (or constitutional principle) in its regulatory activities.
What, however, is the practical impact of recognition of the media pluralism as a constitutional principle? Does the constitutional protection of the media pluralism imply only a negative obligation of the state or also a positive obligation? In other words, should the state only respect the pluralism of the media by refraining from any interference with media activities, or has the state positive constitutional obligation to ensure media pluralism by some positive actions?
Unlike the general guarantee of the freedom of expression, which protects an individual liberty against the state power, the principle of pluralism implies a necessity of adoption of a legislation regulating the media activities.
Th e possible interventions of state power in the media activities may be generally classifi ed into 1) the regulation of access and ownership and 2) the regulation of content 3 . Th e pluralism of media can be seen therefore as the pluralism of owners and also the pluralism of contents. In any case, diversity of contents should be regarded as the ultimate goal of the media regulation. Th e regulation of the media ownership represents (from the freedom of expression point of view) primarily a means to ensure the pluralism of contents.
Th e regulation of access and ownership
Th e measure of a constitutional justifi cation of the access regulation or the ownership regulation is diff erent for broadcast and print media. Th e reasons lie in the diff erent technical conditions for the operation of both types of media. Th ere are no technical barriers for theoretically unlimited number of newspapers. In the case of broadcast media, the situation is diff erent. It was pointedly expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of NBC v. United States 4 , as far back as in 1943, when the court fi rst expressed the need of the licensing regime for broadcast media 5 . According to the court such regulation should not be considered a violation of the freedom of speech (of the First Amendment of U.S. Constitution). U.S. Supreme Court justifi ed a competence of FCC (Federal Communications Commission) to regulate broadcasting sector through the licensing by argument of a limited frequency spectrum and with pregnant summary: " [w] ith everybody on the air, nobody could be heard"
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. Th e more modern technology will allow unlimited access to the broadcast market (the digitization of broadcasting), the less government regulation is necessary. But the control of the broadcast media is necessary not only because of technical reasons. Th e media activities are closely related to the functioning of a democracy in each country. Th e media fulfi ll the role of 'public watchdog' of the state power, but could also be abused to the hidden economic or power purposes. Especially the interconnection of the media and the state offi cials should be dangerous for democracy (e.g. in extreme cases one-sided propaganda in totalitarian regimes). So there is a specifi c public interest in ensuring media pluralism that goes beyond the general reasons for an antitrust regulation of any sector of business 7 .
Th e pluralism is not only a question of a number of existing media but also a question of their mutual relations. Th e main purpose of the regulation of mutual media relations consists in prevention of a possible monopolization of the media market. In the case, that a large number of media will operate in the same area, but all of them will be owned by one subject, the pluralism will be only apparent and unreal with uncertain ensuring of a diversity and variety of a content created by these media.
In addition, any domination on the media market in connection with links to the government institutions, respectively in connection with the exercise of state power is dangerous for a democratic state, and questions the very essence of the media role as representatives of a public opinion and guardians of a democracy.
As already mentioned, one of the tools designed to ensure content pluralism of media environment is the regulation of media ownership. Although such regulation interferes with the right to engage in commercial and economic activities and with the freedom of ownership of some subjects, it is necessary to interfere 4 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States 319 U. S. 190 (1943) . 5 Cf. Heinke, R. S.: Media Law, Th e Bureau of National Aff airs, Washington, 1994 , p. 407. 6 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943 . 7 Cf. Feintuck, M., Varney, M.: Media regulation, public interest and the law, 2nd ed., Edinburg University Press, 2006, p. 74-125. with mentioned freedoms in the interest of free access to information and their free distribution for all subjects.
Th e question of confl icts of rights is similar to a situation in a general antitrust law. Th e antitrust law deals with an issue of free market and a free competition in general. Th e primary purpose of the general antitrust law is not to ensure diversity of content in the media, but to ensure free competition between businessmen (publishers, broadcasters). So the government generally ensures here media pluralism primarily in the sense of pluralism of competitors in the market, as it does in other business areas.
Th e business in the media sphere, however, substantially diff ers from other types of business. A monopoly on production of cars or boots has not as crucial importance for a democratic arrangement of the state as the monopoly of information. Th e legitimate aim of "free market of ideas", which is observed by regulation of media ownership, "weights" more in constitutional rights balancing than a legitimate aim of "free market" in general. Th erefore the antitrust regulations taken in order to protect free trade of ideas can interfere with the activities of competitors more intensively than other antitrust regulations.
To assess the level of pluralism can not be take into account, however, only the number of media, but also their ability to compete. As emphasized by K. Jakubovicz, "is theoretically better that there should be forty rather then twenty newspapers in a country. However, if each of the forty papers has a distribution area where it has a quasi-monopolistic status, pluralism is better served if there are twenty papers whose distribution area extends over the large part of the country, forcing the papers to compete in the same markets" 8 .
Some countries provide specifi c rules on concentration of ownership in the media that go beyond the general antitrust law regulation, because of the specifi c nature of the object of regulation and because of the narrow connection with constitutional duty of the state power to ensure the freedom of expression for everyone 9 .
In the European context we can mention Recommendation No. R (99) 1 of the Council of Europe 10 , which states in Art. 1 that member states should pre-vent or counteract concentrations "that might endanger media pluralism at the national, regional or local levels". According such recommendation the member states for example should "examine the possibility of defi ning thresholds in their law or authorization, licensing or similar procedures to limit the infl uence which a single commercial company or group may have in one or more media sectors"
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.
We usually don't fi nd the provisions dealing with restrictions on cross-media ownership on a constitutional level, but exemptions exist. Th e Portuguese Constitution allows the state to take actions against the concentration of media ownership in the Article 38, paragraph 4 12 , the Greek Constitution establishes a relatively detailed rules against the media concentration in the Article 14, paragraph 9
13
. If the issue of ensuring media pluralism is not mentioned explicitly on a constitutional level, it is necessary to rely solely on the interpretation of a general guarantee of the freedom of expression.
Th e access regulation, not necessarily the content regulation, should be regarded as the main purpose of the licensing regime. One could assume that a plurality of broadcasters will also automatically lead to a plurality of contents. It may not always be so and the state authorities therefore could assess also content aspects in the process of licensing. By granting the license the government provides to an applicant the signifi cant public good consisting in a part of a frequency spectrum and could not satisfy all applicants of course. An expected content of broadcasting can be also used as a criterion in the process of selection among applicants. Th e content regulation is always more dangerous than ures to promote media pluralism, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 19 January 1999, cf. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/Doc/CM_en.asp. 11 Ibid., part I. 12 Art. 38 para. 4 of Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 7th revision (2005): "Th e state shall ensure the media's freedom and independence from political power and economic power by imposing the principle of specialisation on businesses that own general information media, treating and supporting them in a non-discriminatory manner and preventing their concentration, particularly by means of multiple or interlocking interests", http://app. parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/Constitution_VII_revisao_defi nitive.pdf. 13 Art. 14 para. 9 of Constitution of Greece as revised by the parliamentary resolution of April 6th 2001 of the VIIth Revisionary Parliament: "Th e measures and restrictions necessary for fully ensuring transparency and plurality in information shall be specifi ed by law. Th e concentration of the control of more than one information media of the same type or of diff erent types is prohibited. More specifi cally, concentration of more than one electronic information media of the same type is prohibited, as specifi ed by law. Th e capacity of owner, partner, major shareholder or managing director of an information media enterprise, is incompatible with the capacity of owner, partner, major shareholder or managing director of an enterprise that undertakes towards the Public Administration or towards a legal entity of the wider public sector to perform works or to supply goods or services. Th e prohibition of the previous section extends also over all types of intermediary persons, such as spouses, relatives, fi nancially dependent persons or companies. [...]", http://www. nis.gr/npimages/docs/Constitution_EN.pdf.
content-neutral regulation, so the criterion of expected content should be considered and used just as a means for ensuring the widest plurality and diversity of contents produced, not as a means for government to determine value of particular contents.
It is possible to highlight the crucial role of the so-called regulatory media authorities dealing with supervision over the area of the broadcasting sector, particularly with the issuing and withdrawing broadcasting licenses 14 . A position, competencies and particularly independence of such regulatory authorities are even considered so much important in some countries (especially from the division of power point of view), that such authorities are directly enshrined in the constitution as a constitutional body (Portugal 15 , Poland 16 or Greece 17 ).
Content regulation
Th e content plurality can be seen in a diversity, variety and richness of media contents respecting the diff erences in a various groups of people, defi ned for example by ethnicity, language, religion, confession, age, culture, opinions, territorial specifi cs etc.
Generally, the more plurality of media environment is naturally limited, the more law puts emphasis on the plurality of its partial segments. a]n independent administrative body shall be responsible for ensuring the following in the media: a) Th e right to information and the freedom of the press; b) Th e non-concentration of ownership of the media; c) Independence from political power and economic power; d) Respect for personal rights, freedoms and guarantees; e) Respect for the statutes and rules that regulate the work of the media; f) Th at all diff erent currents of opinion are able to express themselves and confront one another; g) Exercise of the rights to broadcasting time, of reply and of political response", http://app.parlamento.pt/site_antigo/ingles/cons_leg/Constitution_VII_revisao_defi nitive.pdf. 16 Th e National Council of Radio and Television Broadcasting in Poland is included in a special branch of state power called in Constitution "Organs of state control and for defence of rights" (Chapter 9 of Constitution of Poland), which covers also "Th e Supreme Chamber of Control" and "Th e Commissioner for Citizens' Rights" (i.e. Ombudsman). Art. 213 para. 1 of the Polish Constitution states that "Th e National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television shall safeguard the freedom of speech, the right to information as well as safeguard the public interest regarding radio broadcasting and television", http://www. An unlimited pluralism is basically possible from purely technical point of view in the case of the print media. Th e pluralism of the print media is limited only by market forces (i.e. by the ability of periodicals to succeed in the media market). Th e law therefore does not require a content plurality of its partial segments (i.e. of particular newspapers, journals or magazines). In the fi eld of broadcasting, however, technical conditions impede full unlimited pluralism of broadcasters. Th e state authorities could therefore impose to broadcasters specifi c duties concerning the program content in the licensing process.
It's not possible to establish a universal and ideal model of the media regulation and therefore approaches to regulation in each country differ 18 . Th ere is diff erence between for example relatively large media market in the USA and relatively small media markets in many European countries, where the markets are so small to provide in itself ideal content pluralism. Diff erent conditions in diff erent countries can therefore correspond to a different constitutionally tolerable level of the government interference with the media activities, or if you like diff erent interpretations of constitutionally guaranteed right to the freedom of expression 19 .
Above mentioned Recommendation No. R (99)1 20 recommends to member states of the Council of Europe to provide political and cultural diversity of content in broadcasting in the Article III 21 . Th e required degree of the content diversity can be either formulated in law or established in the licensing decision for broadcasters. Th is practice was confi rmed by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinaft er "ECHR") as in conformity with the guarantees of the freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinaft er "European Convention") 22 . In ECHR reminded that "the object and purpose of the third sentence of Article 10 § 1 is to make it clear that States are permitted to regulate by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organized in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects. Th e latter are undeniably important, but the grant or refusal of a license may also be made conditional on other considerations, including such matters as the nature and objectives of a proposed station, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a specifi c audience and the obligations deriving from international legal instruments" 24 .
Th e content regulation through the licensing system is according to ECHR sympathetic to the protection of the freedom of expression, if it pursues the objective of pluralism and is not arbitrary. Th e principle of media pluralism can be therefore considered at the level of the ownership plurality and also at the level of the content plurality as a part of a general guarantee of the freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention.
Pluralism and media transparency
Th e transparency of media ownership and the transparency of media control are essential conditions for ensuring media pluralism. In European context we should mention Recommendation No. R (94) 13 on measures to promote media transparency stating e.g. that "regulation of media concentrations presupposes that the competent services or authorities have information which enables them to know the reality of media ownership structures and, in addition, to identify third parties who might exercise an infl uence on their independence" 25 .
Th e transparency must be ensured in particular by requiring that applicants for a license should expose information about their ownership structure. Under the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. Th e exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary." (emphasized by author). the section 17 of the Recommendation Rec (2000) 23 concerning regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector "candidates should indicate their company's structure, owners and capital, and the content and duration of the programmes they are proposing" 26 .
Th e obligation of the media to disclose their ownership structure is important not only for the state authorities for fulfi llment their supervision role but also for all readers, viewers or listeners. Th e recipients of information could better evaluate relevance or gravity of received information with knowledge of the media ownership structure, sources of their fi nancing or their interconnection with other media, businessmen or even with public offi cials.
Th is should be considered conformable with constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, if the law lays down a duty for publishers and broadcasters to periodically disclose their ownership structure. Disclosure of funding sources can also be required, because the type of fi nancing source can show the potential impact on (or infl uence of) broadcaster or publisher. Th e more transparent media are, the more functioning informal control by public opinion will be, respectively the more self-regulation of media will assert, and the less regulation by the state authorities will be needed.
Some constitutions explicitly allow requiring from the media the source of funding because of a potential constitutional confl ict between the protection of property rights and the rights of business on one side and the ensuring transparency of media pluralism as a part of the freedom of expression on the other side. In the case of explicit constitutional base for such requirements there is no doubt, whether such requirements are constitutionally permissible.
Within the frame of the European countries we could fi nd provisions concerning media funding in the Article 30, paragraph 5 of the Constitution of Romania, which provides that "[t]he law may impose upon the mass media the obligation to make public their fi nancing" 27 , in the Article 14, paragraph 9 of the Constitution of Greece, which similarly states that " [t] he law may lay down that fi nancing newspapers and periodicals be made known" 28 , as well as in the Constitution of Portugal, which states in Article 38, paragraph 3 that "the law shall ensure that the names of the owners of media bodies and the means by which those bodies are fi nanced are publicised" 29 . Under Article 21 of the Constitution Although it is not necessary to enshrine such possibility directly in the constitution, it would be advisable to embed it in the statutory level. Above mentioned constitutional rights and requirements should be then balanced and specifi ed by courts in the judicial review practice. Th at would have to be assessed in practice the proportionality between the freedom of expression (and thus the necessary degree of media transparency) on the one hand, and the freedom of property (including for example the business secret) on the other hand.
As already mentioned, the mutual competition of the media is not just an economic issue, but also serves as a means for enhancement of quality of the media work, their mutual refl ection and their informal cross control. Th e media are strongly protected from the government interference because of their "public watchdog" role, but ethic self-regulation is necessarily also assumed. Th e mutual control is therefore an integral part of the media self-regulation. Th e media pluralism can also reduce an impact of potential mistakes of media. As A. de Tocqueville pointed out in the fi rst half of the 19th century in his famous book Democracy in America, "it is an axiom of political science in that country that the only way to neutralize the eff ect of the public journals is to multiply their number" 31 . To some extent, this fi nding could be applied to the broadcast media also. Th e more pluralism of the media is invoked, the more overall infl uence of the media power could be neutralized.
Conclusions and summary
It can be briefl y summarized that in order to ensure pluralism of the media environment is necessary to regulate the cross-ownership and the licenses accumulation in one hands and also to ensure transparency of the media ownership and transparency of the media funding sources.
From the constitutional law point of view there may be two argumentation ways concerning the freedom of expression. An inclination to each of them depends on who we consider as the holder of such freedom. Should be measures for media pluralism regarded as restrictions of the freedom of expression or as ensuring the freedom of expression?
If we restrict broadcasters' possibility to expand their media empires, they could argue that the state authorities interfere with their right to disseminate information in the way that they intend. But the state authorities will defend such restriction arguing that the restriction is made in order to guarantee the freedom of expression of other parties concerned in broadcasting, or more precisely the 30 Constitution of the Italian Republic (1947), http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/ istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf. 31 De Toqueville, A., Frohnen, B.: Democracy in America, Regnery Gateway, 2003, p. 144. right to receive and disseminate information of the general public (right of anyone) which is best ensured by the widest plurality of information providers.
As J. Graubart points out, even in a liberal environment of the USA, certain degree of regulation should be considered in conformity with the constitution: "If government intrusion into private ownership of the media has been viewed at times as necessary to maintain a free press in the United States, western defenders of a privately owned press should concede that government involvement is not always incompatible with a free press" 32 .
Th e media pluralism must be regarded as a part of a general guarantee of the freedom of expression, and this guarantee must imply the certain positive constitutional duty for the state power. Th e freedom of speech includes not only the negative constitutional obligation of the state power (i.e. the obligation not to interfere with individual liberty by certain regulation), but also the positive constitutional obligation (i.e. the obligation to regulate media ownership, competition and transparency) in order to ensure the principle of media pluralism as a part of the freedom of expression guarantee.
Such positive role of the state is expressly mentioned in some constitutions, but the most constitutions expressly guarantee only the negative status of the individual (i.e. the freedom from state interference). Th e positive constitutional obligation of the state power to ensure the media pluralism and the constitutional nature of such principle could be derived by the following argument: If the freedom of expression includes receiving information (the right to be informed) and if this right is guaranteed to everybody, it is necessary for consistent and fair fulfi lling of this right to ensure the widest possible plurality of resources of information and the widest possible plurality of communicated contents.
Th e freedom of expression in its media pluralism dimension should prevail the freedom of expression in its dimension of the media ownership.
32 Graubart, J.: What's News: A Progressive Framework for Evaluating the International Debate over the News, California Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 3, 1989, p. 662. 
